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CONDEMNATION OF TRANSPORTATION
FACILITIES: NEW YORK'S RECENTLY
DEVELOPED PUBLIC UTILITY
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES
AND REMAINING PROBLEM
AREAS
Frank A. Aloit and Arthur Abba Goldbergt
Efficient and comfortable transportation is essential to the welfare
of urban America.1 Privately owned transportation systems are in-
creasingly unprofitable,2 and state regulatory authorities cannot force
them to continue operating at a net loss without raising the constitu-
tional issue of "taking of property without just compensation." 3 To
avoid this issue and ensure adequate transportation, local governments,
with federal assistance,4 are acquiring and operating mass transit fa-
cilities.
In the past few years, at least three governmental entities have
acquired transportation facilities, with two of these acquisitions re-
sulting in protracted litigation. Rochester took over the Rochester
Transit Corporation; the Port Authority condemned the assets of the
Hudson Rapid Tubes Corporation, which provided rail commuter
facilities between New Jersey and Manhattan; and New York City
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1961, University of Rochester; M.P.A.
1962, Syracuse University; LL.B. 1965, Cornell University.
- Deputy Attorney General, State of New Jersey. A.B. 1962, American University;
LL.B. 1965, Cornell University.
1 See the recitation in the Urban Mass Transportation Act. 49 U.S.C. § 1601 (1964).
This Act was passed in 1964 to assist state and local governments to preserve mass trans-
portation systems.
2 For a discussion of this problem as it affects railroads, see Thomas, Public Utilities:
Discontinuance of Railroad Service, 14 RuTG-as L. REV. 345 (1960). In recognition of the
financial crisis, Transportation Secretary John A. Volpe reportedly plans a $10 million
program to overhaul the nation's mass transit system. Newark (NJ.) Star Ledger, June
24, 1969, at 1, cols. 7-8.
3 Nevertheless, in 1957 the New Jersey Legislature passed a resolution forbidding
further discontinuance of passenger railroad service within the state pending a public
study. See In re New York, S. & W.R.R., 25 N.J. 343, 347, 136 A.2d 408, 410 (1957). See also
Susquehanna Transit Commuters Ass'n v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 55 N.J. Super.
377, 410-11, 151 A.2d 9, 27 (1959). In In re New Jersey & N.Y.R.R., 12 N.J. 281, 96
A.2d 526, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 868 (1953), the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested
that there was no constitutional right, regardless of public convenience and necessity, to
discontinue a train on a net-loss railroad.
4 See note 1 supra.
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acquired the Fifth Avenue Bus Coach system. Rochester settled its
acquisition after some pre-litigation skirmishing, partially because of
the guidelines provided by the previous cases. 5 Those guidelines, how-
ever, are unclear and, in some instances, inadequate.
We propose to study the two major lawsuits, In re City of New
York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.)6 and In re Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp. (PATH),7 which spanned a five-year period in which the
New York Court of Appeals wrote three major opinions dealing with
the principles of compensation applicable to the condemnation of
public utilities.8 The opinions and the lower court background for
each case constitute an intensive effort by the courts of one state to
identify and apply rules for valuation in the condemnation of a public
utility for continued use. We will present the opinions, summarize
each principle of valuation, and comment upon alternative formulas
for compensation. Three collateral issues will also be dealt with: the
question of the value to be placed upon the franchise of a public
utility, the question of pension disposition in the transition from pri-
vate to public ownership, and the possible unconstitutionality of a
statutory function of the Public Service Commission in condemnation
cases.
I
TH Fifth Avenue AND PATH CAsES
There is a vital distinction between "utility" condemnations and
"private" or "traditional" condemnations. When a private business
5 One author handled the PATH litigation in both the United States Supreme Court
appeal and certiorari attempts. The other author was employed as special counsel for
the Rochester litigation.
6 46 Misc. 2d 14, 259 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct.), on objection to tentative decree 47
Misc. 2d 734, 263 N.YS.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 463, 261 N.Y.S.2d 784
(Ist Dep't 1965), modified, 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219 N.E.2d 410, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52, remittitur
amended, 18 N.Y.2d 741, 221 N.E.2d 174, 274 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1966), appeal dismissed, 386
U.S. 778 (1967), on remand to New York Supreme Court, 157 N.Y.L.J., April 18, 1967,
at 18, col. 8, afftd, 29 App. Div. 2d 638, 287 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Ist Dep't 1968), modified, 22
N.Y.2d 613, 241 NXE.2d 717, 294 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1968), remittitur amended, 24 N.Y.2d 773,
247 N.E.2d 861, 300 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969). For the present status of the Fifth Avenue
litigation, see Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
7 48 Misc. 2d 485, 265 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1965), 50 Misc. 2d 613, 271 N.Y.S.2d
95 (Sup. Ct.), on objection to tentative decree 52 Misc. 2d 943, 277 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Sup.
Ct.), modified, 27 App. Div. 2d 32, 276 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Ist Dep't 1966), modified, 20 N.Y.2d
457, 231 N.E.2d 734, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24, remittitur amended, 20 N.Y.2d 968, 233 N.E.2d 860,
286 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1967), cert. denied, 390 US. 1002 (1968).
8 For historical perspective and a discussion of theories for valuing utility property
in general, see 2 L. ORGEL, VALbATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 200-05, at
58-80 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEFL].
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is condemned, the purpose is generally to acquire the underlying land.
Utility condemnation, on the other hand, seeks to continue the business
as a public venture. The rule in private condemnation is that the
taking is in rem; accordingly, compensation need be paid only for
tangible items, land, and buildings, without allowances for business
losses and goodwill.9 The rationale of the rule is that the owner may
relocate and continue his business and that only the land and buildings,
not the business, are taken.'0 The condemnation of public utilities,
however, proceeds on an entirely different basis. Here, the public
authority condemns the utility not only to obtain the physical assets
but also to continue operation of the business." Therefore, valuation
in utility condemnations must include an allowance for the value of
the business.12
A. Fifth Avenue
In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.)1 in-
volved the condemnation by New York City of two giant omnibus lines.
In addition to compensation for such tangible property as land, build-
ings, and buses14 the owners sought damages for loss of "going concern
value"-that increment of value inherent in a business as an opera-
tional entity over and above the value of its tangible assets.15 The
owners also asserted claims for items of consequential damage, in-
cluding pensions, workmen's compensation, and tort claims administra-
tion.16
The trial court made detailed findings concerning valuation of
the items of tangible property condemned by the city. While some of
the findings here are debatable, especially those involving depreciation
formulas,' 7 they do not concern the subject of this article.
The trial court stated the valuation principle to be market value
-"what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller."' 8 In
9 Id. at 58.
1o United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 282 (1943). This view is
criticized in Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Good Will, and Business Losses
in Eminent Domain, 53 Co'NELL L. REv. 604, 626-36 (1968).
11 20RGtL 58-59.
12 Id.
13 46 Misc. 2d 14, 259 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
14 Id. at 16-17, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., the trial court's formula for valuing bus garages and its conclusion that
although they were "specially designed as bus garages," they were not specialties. Id. at
33, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 335. Cf. Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 10, at 607-14.
18 46 Misc. 2d at 19, 259 N.YS.2d at 321, quoting United States v. Miller, 317 U.S.
369, 374 (1943).
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applying this standard the court noted that both bus lines throughout
much of their operating history were unprofitable and that no willing
buyer would pay a substantial amount for such enterprises.19 The
owners contended that city regulation caused the unprofitability. They
projected profitable operations if routes were rearranged, certain
personnel eliminated, and certain fare increases granted.20 They argued
that the companies' earnings were depressed because of the city's un-
reasonable fare regulation; accordingly, the companies were entitled
to a substantial item of damages for going concern value because
eliminating the unreasonable regulation would make possible prof-
itable operation. The trial court rejected this argument.21
The trial court also dismissed the owners' claim for compensation
for expenditures made in developing an integrated, synchronized, and
coordinated coach route operation, including operating schedules, lay-
out of bus garages and shops, operating rights and permits, and per-
petual franchises. 22 Again, the trial court based its conclusion upon the
market value criterion, commenting: "Nor would buyers ordinarily
pay anything for the seller's expenditures in developing a trained labor
force or for the other costs claimed here, especially where the end result
of those expenditures fails to produce a profit."2 3
The court did conclude, however, that the tangible assets of the
companies should be valued as "property in use" rather than as scrap.24
For example, the court recognized that the garages were specially
designed for omnibus use and as such were worth more than their
simple economic value as ordinary garages. Applying this premise, the
court set awards for each category of tangible property.25
A substantial portion of the trial court's opinion concerned the
claim for consequential damages. Distinguishing "severance damage,"
which is compensable, from "consequential damage," which ordinarily
is not, the court argued that each item of consequential damage in-
volved items not taken by the city; rather, they constituted "subsisting
19 Id. at 25, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 327.
20 Id. at 21, 259 N.YS.2d at 323.
21 The court argued that there were both practical and legal obstacles to a fare
increase. On a practical level, the city's operation of a rapid transit system at 15 cents
precluded the increase for reasons of competition. Moreover, the court argued that because
the claimants had consented to charge 15 cents in their franchise agreement, they had no
constitutional right to the increase. Finally, it concluded that no statutory right to
charge a higher fare existed. Id. at 21-22, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 323-24.
22 Id. at 29, 259 N.YS.2d at 330-31.
23 Id. at 29, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
24 Id. at 26, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
25 Id. at 43, 259 N.YS.2d at 345.
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contractual liabilities of the condemnee." 26 The owners argued that
each item of contractual liability was funded from the fare boxes, i.e.,
payable out of current revenue, and that since the city gained the
benefit of the fare box income, it should also assume its burdens and
pay for liabilities funded therefrom. 2 The trial court rejected this
contention on the ground that the city as a condemnor could be liable
only for items actually appropriated and could not be liable for what
amounted to a frustration of contract liabilities continuing in the
condemnee.28
On the basis of the lower court opinions,29 which set a value
for claimants' property in terms of tangible assets only, the Fifth Av-
enue cases were taken through their first appeal. The First Department
affirmed the trial court's findings.8 0 The first appeal to the Court of
26 Id. at 38, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
'27 Id. at 41, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
28 Id. at 89, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 340-41.
29 Upon the filing of objections to the tentative decree, the trial court adhered to
its prior decision. It again stressed the necessity of valuing the tangible assets as property
in use and rejected the city's renewed argument that scrap value should be the standard
applied. In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 47 Misc. 2d 734, 737,
263 N.Y.S.2d 96, 99-100 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Similarly, it rejected any award for goodwill
(going concern value) on the ground that the claimants failed to show an actual history
of profitable operations. Id. at 735, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 98. It is questionable whether the
trial court's language---"they must show a history of profitable operations"--represents
either the weight of authority or the actual holdings of the decisions cited by the trial
court.
30 23 App. Div. 2d 463, 261 N.Y.S.2d 784 (lst Dep't 1965). The primary question
argued on appeal to the First Department was the trial court's alleged failure to award
damages for loss of going concern value. Id. at 464, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 786. The argument
that going concern value should have been separately valued was rejected, as was the
city's renewed argument that the tangible property (the physical assets) should have
been valued as unconnected units of property without relation to their integration into
claimants' use for omnibus line operation. The court concluded that "in avowedly
bottoming its award on the premise that claimants' properties must be evaluated as
properties 'in use', Special Term made ample provision for intangibles of such nature,
although without specific itemization." Id. at 467, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 788. Implicit in the
affirmance was recognition of the propriety of the trial court's application of the fair
market value standard to define the limits of compensation for condemned property.
Justice Rabin dissented, principally on the ground that the court below had failed
to make awards for certain going concern assets "without which continuity of service
could not have been maintained." Id. at 469, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (emphasis in original).
The dissent also concluded, we believe correctly, that "going concern value" is separate
and distinct from "goodwill." Justice Rabin did not argue for compensation of goodwill,
but noted parenthetically that a value for goodwill could be set "by first fixing a
reasonable rate and then capitalizing the net income that would have been earned had
such rate been fixed." Id. at 470, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 791-92. This formula makes likely the
lumping together of all items of intangible damage, and whether a summation of
component items of damage for intangibles will equal this figure remains unclear. Justice
Rabin appeared to agree with claimants' argument for consequential damages arising out
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Appeals was characterized by the majority as presenting only the issue
whether the disposition below proceeded on erroneous principles of
law regarding the valuation of intangible property. 1 Unlike the courts
below, the Court of Appeals concluded that the rate regulation by the
city was unreasonable and that but for this factor claimants' operations
would have been profitable.32 On the basis of this conclusion the court
fixed the standard for compensation as follows:
The measure of value in this case is the cost of putting the
entire transit systems together new plus all improvements, tangible
and intangible, less depreciation.... [flhe going concern's intan-
gible assets are equally as essential to the city's ability to furnish
bus service as are the tangible assets seized and used. These going
concern attributes or so-called intangible assets such'as coach routes,
operating schedules, operating records and systems of procedures
and trained personnel made it possible for the city to operate the
transit system the day after the condemnation. Under the theory
erroneously followed below, the assets in which the owners of the
bus systems had invested substantial sums could be taken without
compensation. These assets, without which the city would not
have operated the system, can no more be taken without compen-
sation than can its tangible corporate property.88
Continuing, the court stated that "[c]laimants' undeniably competent
and efficient personnel were taken over by the city along with claimants'
routes, franchises, operating schedules, accounting and maintenance
records, etc.-all going concern assets for which claimants must be duly
compensated."8 4 The order below was modified and remanded to
the Special Term "for a determination of the value of the going con-
cern assets as an addition to the amount heretofore awarded and, as
so modified, affirmed .... "2
of pension liability. "It may well be that such commitments are to pay for a 'thing of
value' of which the city is the beneficiary, having taken over not only the properties but
the personnel as well." Id, at 471, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
31 "The only issue presented on this appeal which calls for a modification is the
reliance of the courts below on erroneous principles of law regarding the evaluation of
the condemnees' intangible property." 18 N.Y.2d 212, 217-18, 219 N.E.2d 410, 411, 275
N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1966).
32 Id. at 220-21, 219 NE.2d at 412-13, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 56. The trial court's holding
that a history of profitable operations is a prerequisite to compensation for going concern
value (supra note 29) was rejected by the Court of Appeals: "[l]n all the cases supporting
the view that where there is no earning capacity there is no going concern value, the
condemnees were inherently incapable of profitable operation because of the economic
law of diminishing returns or inefficient management." Id. at 220, 219 N.E.2d at 413, 273
N.Y.S.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
83 Id. at 221, 219 N.E.2d at 413, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 56-57.
34 Id. at 223-24, 219 N.E.2d at 415, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
35 Id. at 224, 219 N.E.2d at 415, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 58-59.
1970]
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The Court of Appeals's modification must be taken as an affirmance
of those portions of the trial court opinion concerning consequential
damages.80 Even this should not close the question, since certain
language used by the trial court indicates that an award might have
been made on the items of consequential damages had claimant been
able to demonstrate actual profits.37 Although the case traveled once
again full circle through the trial court and up to the Court of Appeals,
nothing further of any consequence was said by any court concerning
consequential damages. The courts' summary disposition of this issue
is unsatisfactory, leaving this problem area to be developed in sub-
sequent litigation.
On remand, the trial court approached the question of valuing
going concern assets by basing its analysis on the market value standard.
Quoting from Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,38 the court held
that the claimant must establish the price that a prudent buyer would
pay for the intangible assets.39 Proceeding on this basis, the trial court
considered the following categories of going concern assets:
1. Trained personnel: bus operators.
2. Trained personnel: maintenance force.
3. Trained personnel: administrative staff.
4. Trained personnel: clerical employees.
5. Trained personnel: executive personnel.
6. Layout of coach routes.
7. Route development.
8. Operating schedules.
9. Operating systems, procedures and records: accounting.
10. Operating systems, procedures and records: maintenance.
11. Operating systems, procedures and records: personnel.
12. Selection and arrangement of shop and garage equipment.
13. Perpetual franchises and operating rights and permits.
Allowances were made for only five of the foregoing: trained per-
36 See text at notes 26-28 supra.
37 Claimants argue that "these items were operating expenses recoverable from
the fare box and should follow the fare box into the City's hands." This dis-
regards the stark fact that the fare box was progressively becoming less able to
take care of even the current operating expenses, leaving nothing available for
these expenses attributable to past operations.
46 Misc. 2d at 42, 259 N.YS.2d at 44. This emphasis upon actual profitability is perhaps
less realistic than Justice Rabin's comment that regardless of profits the city might be
liable for pension payments since it admittedly acquired the benefit of an efficient and
trained body of personnel upon condemnation. Note 80 supra.
38 338 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1949).
39 157 N.Y.L.J., April 18, 1967, at 18, col. 8.
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sonnel (bus operators), trained personnel (maintenance force), trained
personnel (administrative staff), trained personnel (clerical employees),
and operating schedules.40 With the exception of franchises, each other
category of going concern assets was rejected because (1) a prudent
buyer would not, in acquiring the business or in putting together such
a business, expend any funds for the item and/or (2) insufficient proof
existed.41 An award for franchises was rejected because "[t]he city did
not need to acquire these franchises in order to operate the buses over
the routes theretofore used by claimants, since the city always had the
right to do S0."'42
The trial court then applied the "percentage tangible asset" test
as a check on the accuracy of its computations of damage for going
concern assets.43 Noting cases that had set percentages of from four to
ten percent, the court found that its determinations for intangible
going concern assets amounted to 8.5 percent of the award for tangible
assets.
44
On appeal from the remand, the First Department ignored the
trial court's repeated language that certain items of going concern
damage were disallowed partly because a willing purchaser would
not in a private acquisition have spent any money for these items. In
affirming the award below, the Appellate Division attributed the trial
court's failure to make awards for these categories of going concern
assets solely to a failure of proof in regard to these assets by claimants.45
Justice McGivern dissented, characterizing the language of the
Court of Appeals in identifying going concern assets as a mandate to
determine a value for these assets rather than a mere suggestion that
these items might be compensable.4 6 He questioned the trial court's
reliance on the "willing buyer-willing seller" market value criterion
40 Id. at 19, col. 4.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 On a rehearing necessitated by objections to the tentative decree in PATH, a
flat 107 increment was added by the trial court to the award for the condemned Hudson
& Manhattan tubes. In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 943, 945, 277
N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Whether this disposition in any way influenced the
trial court on the remand in the Fifth Avenue case cannot be ascertained from the
decision, since no reference is made to the FATH litigation.
44 157 N.Y.L.J., April 18, 1967, at 19, col. 5.
45 29 App. Div. 2d 638, 639, 287 N.Y.S.2d 454, 456 (1st Dep't 1968). The Appellate
Division failed even to approach the question whether this "failure of proof" indicated
no competent evidence in the record or whether the trial court's persistence in applying
an improper valuation premise-willing buyer to willing seller in hypothetical market-
precluded it from utilizing competent proof in the record.
46 Id. at 639-40, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 456-58 (dissenting opinion).
1970]
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when the Court of Appeals had specifically stated that going concern
value should be calculated on the basis of a development cost theory;
the dissent also argued that allowances should have been made for the
items disallowed by the trial court.
B. PATH
In this posture, an affirmance by the Appellate Division over a
strong dissent, the Fifth Avenue case again reached the Court of Ap-
peals. In the interim, the Court of Appeals had decided In re Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp.47 In PATH, the Court of Appeals
specifically disagreed with the percent method of valuing intangibles.
The court again stressed the importance of using the development cost
theory to value going concern assets and repudiated the traditional
market value method for utility condemnations.8
At the time of taking the Hudson Tubes were in poor financial
condition, having recently gone through a bankruptcy reorganization. 49
47 20 N.Y.2d 457, 231 N.E.2d 734, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1967).
48 [We believe that Special Term erred in awarding $5,000,000 for going concern
value by taking 10% of the total award for tangible property. While there is
evidence that such a value exists in this case, there is no proof in the record to
sustain Special Term's finding that the claimant is entitled to an award of an
additional 10% of the values fixed for the tunnel and non-tunnel properties.
There is no basis or warrant in law for any such rule of thumb. A finding of
going concern value must be based upon evidence paralleling what we held
would have to be shown in the Fifth Ave. Coach case, that is, the cost of organiz-
ing and systematizing the enterprise, such as the cost of developing operating
schedules, operating records, systems of procedure and the training of personnel.
Id. at 471-72, 231 N.E.2d at 740, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 33 (footnotes and citations omitted).
49 The railroad had been beset by financial troubles since beginning operations in
1911. It had not paid a dividend on its common stock since 1932 or on its preferred stock
since 1933. It had not paid full interest on its junior indebtedness since 1934 or any
interest on its total indebtedness since 1950. It had produced no net income since 1952
and, in the four years immediately preceding 1962, had incurred the following operating
deficits:
1958 ...................... $331,000
1959 ...................... $488,000
1960 ...................... $504,000
1961 ...................... $466,000
The railroad was also faced with capital replacement requirements impossible of resolu-
tion so long as it remained in private hands.
The railroad was forced into reorganization in 1954 and emerged from reorganization
at the beginning of 1962 under a new corporate structure. The reorganization plan recom-
mended by the trustee and adopted by the bankruptcy court was premised on the convic-
tion that the railroad was utterly insolvent. The result was that (a) all stockholders'
interests, both common and preferred, were wiped out; (b) unsecured creditors were paid
in cash at the rate of 10 cents per dollar; and (c) the railroad operation was severed
from the only income-producing asset of the old railroad company, the twin 22-story office
buildings that were constructed on top of the railroad's downtown Manhattan terminal,
to prevent the railroad's deficits from causing the financial demise of the office buildings.
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Unlike the situation in Fifth Avenue, there was no unreasonable reg-
ulation; the company was simply commercially incapable of profitable
operations.50 There were no prospective commercial purchasers. Al-
though the Court of Appeals noted that under the circumstances
traditional rules required a determination that the value of the prop-
erty "to its owners was liquidation or scrap value,"51 it nevertheless
modified the award below and remanded for a determination of value
for going concern assets. 52 The court stressed the owner's expenditures
in creating a useful transportation system 53 and invoked an equitable
balancing rule, commenting: "when the market value has been too
difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest in-
justice to the owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied other
standards. '54
C. The Second Fifth Avenue Opinion
In its second Fifth Avenue5 5 opinion, the Court of Appeals in-
dicated that the trial court on remand improperly applied a market
50 The fact is crucial to understanding why the principles of the Fifth Avenue case
may have been erroneously applied to the facts of the PATH case. This is suggested by
Justice Burke, who enunciated the principles of Fifth Avenue by writing the majority
opinion therein but dissented in the PATH litigation.
In an advisory report rendered to the bankruptcy court, recommending approval of a
proposed reorganization plan as fair and feasible, the Securities and Exchange Commission
noted:
The report concluded that the Debtor, as a private enterprise, could produce
no foreseeable return to its present security holders; consequently, the only value
would be the salvage resulting from the liquidation, which is estimated as of
December 31, 1959, at $2,573,800 for the railroad properties exclusive of the
tunnels. In an earlier report on the liquidation value of the railroad assets, the
engineers had arrived at a value of $525,000 for the tunnels on the basis of their
use to carry telephone lines, resulting in a combined liquidation value of $3,098,800.
In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 39 S.E.C. 852, 865 (1960).
51 Id. at 465-66, 231 N.E.2d at 737, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 28. In arriving at a scrap or
liquidation value standard for compensation, the Appellate Division rejected a market
value test, on the ground that "properties of this sort are in a sense unique and are rarely
if ever bought and sold in the open market." It also rejected the substitute facility
doctrine and closely related reproduction cost tests, on the ground that neither could be
applied where a claimant failed to show that replacement was necessary or that reproduc-
tion was reasonable "as a good commercial investment." 27 App. Div. 2d at 40-43, 276
N.Y.S.2d at 290-93.
52 20 N.Y.2d 457, 231 N.E.2d 734, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24.
53 Id. at 468, 231 N.E.2d at 738, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 30. "A condemnor should not be
permitted to tell [the owner]: 'It's only worth scrap or less.'" Id.
54 Id. at 468, 231 N.E.2d at 738, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 30-31 (emphasis in original). We will
later discuss the dissenting opinion of Judge Burke with respect to the standard of com-
pensation applied by the court in the PATH case. In Judge Burke's view the majority
improperly applied a "value to the taker" standard for compensation. Id. at 481, 231
N.E.2d at 746, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
55 22 N.Y.2d 613, 241 N.E.2d 717, 294 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1968).
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value, "willing buyer-willing seller" standard for determining com-
pensation.56 The court characterized the trial court's failure to make
awards for route layout and development, operating systems, records
and procedures (for accounting, maintenance, and personnel), and
franchises, operating rights, and permits, along with certain categories
of trained personnel, including maintenance and janitorial help and
executive personnel, as conflicting with both the evidence and the
initial directive of the court.57 The court's rationale in the second
opinion, as in the first, was that each of these items contributed to and
was an essential component of the entity.58 Accordingly, the develop-
ment cost for each of these items should be an item of damage to the
owner of a condemned utility. The court also rejected the trial court's
reliance on the percent method for checking going concern value.59 The
Fifth Avenue case is again in the hands of the trial court for the formu-
lation of a decree in accordance with the two Court of Appeals opin-
ions.
II
PRINCIPLES OF VALUATION AND METHODS OF COMPENSATION
The Court of Appeals has dearly disapproved of the generally
applied market value, "willing buyer-willing seller" standard for
56 In footnote three of its opinion, the Court of Appeals indicated that on remand
the trial court recognized that the property should be valued by the reproduction cost
less depredation method but nonetheless proceeded to apply the market value test, and
improperly at that: "Were the 'willing buyer' rule applicable to this case, it is nevertheless
improper, even under this rule, to endow the 'hypothetical buyer' with all the powers of
a sovereign, as the court did when it valued claimants' franchises." Id. at 620 & n.3, 241
N.E.2d at 720 & n.3, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 505 & n.3.
57 Id. at 621-27, 241 N.E.2d at 720-24, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 506-12.
58 Id. at 619-20, 241 N.E.2d at 719, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 504-06. It is significant that the ma-
jority indicated in a footnote to the opinion that the PATH case pushed the rule for
compensation even further. The Court of Appeals there held that compensation should
be paid even though it was "dear that the condemned facility is 'inherently incapable' of
operating at a profit." Id. at 619 & n.2, 241 N.E.2d at 719 & n.2, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 505 8- n.2.
59 Were we to bind ourselves to such a mechanical jurisprudence, these utility
rate cases would in any event be inapplicable. As the city's expert testified, a
proper rule (should one be employed) for bus companies would require an award
for going concern of 20% of the tangible assets. In this case, that would be
$6,070,708. Thus, by properly employing the verification test suggested by Special
Term, it becomes apparent that an award of only $2,577,500 is indeed inadequate.
Id. at 627, 241 N.E.2d at 724, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 511-12. Implicit in the court's holding in this
regard is its recognition that using the conventional 10% of tangible assets to reflect the
value of intangibles is inappropriate for an omnibus line in which, unlike conventional
utilities, operating expense rather than capital investment is the primary risk to investors.
See, e.g., E. NicHois, RuLING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION: RATE OF REruRN 438
(1955).
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compensation in utility condemmitions. Absence of a free market for
privately owned utilities, 60 due in part to monopoly factors, subsidies,
and government regulation of utilities, supports the court's position.6'
If the hypothetical perfect market is not the standard for compensation,
what rule did the courts apply in the Fifth Avenue and PATH cases?
The condemnors argued in both cases that since the businesses were
in fact not making a profit, the owners were entitled only to scrap value
for the tangible assets. This argument was rejected in Fifth Avenue
by the Court of Appeals which permitted compensation to be based
on a capability of profitable operations rather than actual profitable
operations.6 2 The Court of Appeals's analysis in Fifth Avenue does
not focus on factors showing the gain to the taker,6 3 such as the reason
for condemnation, special adaptability for public use, alterations
necessary to permit the public use, and whether the taking was simply
to improve public service or was a vehicle, like taxing to increase
public revenues.6 4 Rather, the court simply eliminated the artificial
restraints-unreasonable regulation-making impossible an equitable
valuation of the assets of the claimants. The court thus, to a certain
extent, set up a "market in a vacuum," free of governmental-restraint,
to determine the owner's loss. 65 May we then conclude that the stan-
dard applied was what the owner would have lost in the taking had
there not been extraneous market factors, including severe rate reg-
ulation?
60 See, e.g., 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 431-47 (1937) [hereinafter cited
as BONRIGHT]; 20RGEL §§ 202-03, at 65-67, § 205, at 79.
61 Monopoly factors in the regulatory context are discussed in Onondaga County
Water Auth. v. New York State Water Serv. Corp., 285 App. Div. 655, 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d
755, 763 (4th Dep't 1955), and City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 202
(1910). The question of subsidies was discussed in the second lower court opinion in the
Fifth Avenue case, specifically in terms of the contracts entered into between the com-
pany and various public authorities for the transportation of school children. In re City
of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 47 Misc. 2d 734, 736-37, 263 N.Y.S.2d 96,
99 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
62 18 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 219 N.E.2d at 412-13, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 55-57. This aspect of
the Fifth Avenue case and an interesting side issue-the propriety of collaterally attacking
the reasonableness of a rate structure in the condemnation proceeding when the owners
have failed to directly attack the rate structure before the public service commission of
competent jurisdiction or by statutory review procedures-are discussed in Note, Going
Concern Value in Condemnation of Unprofitable Public Utilities, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 752,
756-61 (1967).
63 It is a basic principle of condemnation law that the taker's peculiar use of a
condemned property should not be considered in fixing the award for the taking. 1
ORGEL § 81. But ef. id. at ch. 8.
64 Note, however, the difference in approach in the PATH opinion. 20 N.Y.2d at 464-
72, 231 N.E2d at 736-41, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 27-33.
65 18 N.Y.2d at 220-21, 219 N.E.2d at 412-13, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 55-57. Cf. 1 ORGEL § 87.
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Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals's analysis in PATH defies
this tidy analysis.6 The unprofitability of the Hudson Tubes was not
attributable to unreasonable rate regulation.67 Continued private
ownership promised bankruptcy and receivership.68 Under these cir-
cumstances, the resolve of the Court of Appeals in PATH to com-
pensate the owner for going concern value cannot be explained by any
determination that the business was capable /of profitable operation.
The court considered two factors in finding going concern value.
First, "[t]his owner has developed its property at a cost of millions of
dollars and operated it for more than 50 years."6 9 Second, "[i]t [the
tubes] is admittedly of great usefulness in the daily transportation of
thousands of commuters."70 On the basis of these findings, the Court of
Appeals rejected the award below of scrap value:
Can it be said by any objective standard that an award of
scrap value-nothing-is fair and just for the tunnel property, an
essential part of an essential public facility, which cost some
$32,000,000 to construct, which would cost in excess of $400,000,000
to reproduce and which, with some minor expenditures, will
function as good as new for an indefinite period? We think not.7 1
This analysis appears at first blush to be contrary to the "value to the
owner" standard promulgated in Fifth Avenue; in PATH the court
found it inequitable to award an owner scrap value for a facility with
66 For the sake of simplicity, the PATH case is discussed in terms of "value to the
taker" and "loss to the owner;" but the terms are inappropriate to describe the true
nature of the property of which claimant was deprived. In PATH "value" to the taker
was acquisition of an antiquated, financially debilitated railroad which required the ex-
penditure of tens of millions of dollars and which would produce nothing but financial
losses for the indefinite future; "loss" to the owner was an eagerly sought opportunity to
rid itself of commercial property incurring mounting losses, which could not have con-
tinued in private operation for very long.
67 As was stated by Judge Burke in dissent in the PATH case:
Today, however, we are told that the claimant owner of a decrepit, financially
hopeless transportation system, tailored to the measurements of an ancient, badly
mended tunnel is entitled, by reason of the decision of the public authorities to
take over its operations, rehabilitate it at a cost of about 80 million dollars, and
assume its losses, to a special dispensation from this basic rule.
In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 475, 231 N.E.2d 734, 742, 285
N.YS.2d 24, 86 (1967).
68 See Official Transcript of Proceeding before Mr. Justice Quinn, July 14, 1962, at
43-45 (read in part in evidence on the trial of the PATH proceeding). It was because lack
of funds promised imminent cessation of private railroad operations that the legislatures
of New Jersey and New York enacted concurrent legislation in 1962 directing the acqui-
sition of the railroad. 20 N.Y.2d at 465, 231 N.E.2d at 736, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
69 20 N.Y.2d at 468, 231 NE.2d at 738, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 470, 231 N.E.2d at 739, 285 N.Y.S2d at 32.
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substantial utility for the public. But is it proper to conclude that the
court adopted a "value to the taker" test?72
To focus solely on the issue of profitability at the date of taking
would have made determination of the owner's loss in PATH pointless.
The Court of Appeals requires a broader inquiry. In addition to
capability of profitable operation, the amount of expenditures necessary
to develop the facility must also be determined.73 This "development
cost" theory results in compensating the owner for his loss in terms
of the history of expenditures in developing the business.74 Of course,
"but for" its usefulness to the public, continuance of private operation
would make inevitable the permanent loss of these development costs.7 5
The court in PATH may also have overlooked the owner's previous
compensation for development cost through amortization and tax
writedowns.7 6 In terms of the analysis of the Court of Appeals in the
Fifth Avenue and PATH cases, it can be concluded that the owners
were paid for physical plant, all tangible assets, in the broadest sense,
and for all of what the court characterized as the intangible, going
concern assets of the business. Note, however, that claims for conse-
quential damages were rejected by each court passing upon the ques-
tion in the Fifth Avenue case.77
Certain tentative conclusions about New York's valuation standards
can be drawn from the PATH and Fifth Avenue cases. First, while a
market value, "willing buyer-willing seller" standard was rejected as
the exclusive measure, the Court of Appeals certainly applied a part
of that standard in hypothesizing a regulation-free market in Fifth
Avenue before proceeding to valuation of the intangible assets. Second,
a partial reliance on a "value to the taker" theory may be inferred,
insofar as the valuation arrived at in Fifth Avenue is admittedly hy-
pothetical and reflects only the promise of future operations unham-
pered by governmental restraints. Similarly, the emphasis by the court
72 See text accompanying note 66 supra. At least one writer has so criticized the
PATH case. Note, Eminent Domain-Depreciated Original Cost Held To Be Just Com-
pensation for Unprofitable Railroad, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 788, 799-91 (1968).
73 20 N.Y.2d at 470-71, 231 N.E.2d at 740, 285 N.Y.S.2d at 32-33; 1 ORGEL § 92.
74 Cynics might say that on the facts of the PATH case, the result compensates the
railroad's creditors many times in excess of the value of their loss.
75 See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
76 In proceedings before the New York State Tax Commission a few months prior
to the condemnation proceedings, the railroad protested an $8 million valuation as ex-
cessive, claiming that its properties had "no value on a going concern basis."
77 See pp. 424-28 infra. If a pure "value to the owner" standard for compensation had
been applied, would it not have been necessary for the courts to make an award for each
and every item of the owner's loss, including provable consequential damages?
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in PATH on the public usefulness of the property must be noted.
Third, either standard may be subject to the court's conclusion that
the owner cannot be compensated for any items of consequential
damage.78 Perhaps what the Court of Appeals did in Fifth Avenue and
PATH defies precise classification in terms of either the "owner's loss"
or the "taker's gain" formula. The common denominator may simply
be equity balancing--"a result which is 'just' both to an owner whose
property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill."79
A. Formulas for Compensation
The Court of Appeals's use of a development cost theory8 to cal-
culate the value of going concern assets requires computation of the
"cost" of each item classified by the court as a going concern asset.81
An item so classified is included even if, like the outmoded tunnels in
PATH, it would not be reproduced by anyone today.82 This rule seems
clearly inequitable.83
78 See pp. 424-28 infra.
79 In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 470, 231 N.E.2d 734, 739,
285 N.Y.S.2d 24, 32 (1967), quoting United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S.
121, 123 (1950). One of the authors vigorously dissents on the "justness" of the PATH
decision. For one who participated in the case on behalf of New Jersey, the feeling is
inescapable that the case resulted in a windfall for speculators.
We commend to purists intent upon fitting the holdings of these cases into a single
category Professor Hale's article on value to the taker, which may provide a categorical
classification that we have not discerned. Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation
Cases, 31 COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1931).
80 The development cost theory applied by the Court of Appeals encompasses not
only the traditional elements of that theory but also elements of the comparative plant
theory or business reproduction method and the accumulated deficits or unrequired costs
theory. See generally 2 ORGEL § 216; Lewis, Going Value and Rate Valuation, 26 Micii.
L. Rzv. 713 (1928). This theory is distinguishable from the somewhat similar substitute
facility doctrine.
81 In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 22 N.Y.2d 613, 619-20,
241 N.E.2d 717, 719-20, 294 N.Y.S.2d 502, 504-06 (1968); In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 471-72, 231 N.E.2d 734, 740, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24, 33 (1967); In re City
of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 18 N.Y.2d 212, 221, 219 N.E.2d 410, 413,
273 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56-57 (1966). Of the problems involved in this determination, that of
classifying items as going concern assets is probably the most difficult.
82 In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 32, 41-42, 276 N.Y.S.2d
283,291-92 (1st Dep't 1966); cf. In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 22
N.Y.2d 613, 623-24, 241 N.E.2d 717, 722-23, 294 N.Y.S.2d 502, 507-09 (1968).
83 For example, because the PATH tunnels were originally intended to accommodate
streetcars, the tunnels are smaller and contain sharper curves than modern tunnels. In
spite of the $30 million awarded for the tunnels, all the New York courts considering
the matter have recognized that neither the tunnels nor the railroad would be reproduced
by anyone today. In fact, expenditures totaling $125 million have already been made by
Port Authority to modernize the railroad's facilities.
Under the substitute facility doctrine, the award must be sufficient to finance a re.
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Although easy to apply, because of the company's cost accounting
records, the development cost theory may be based upon arbitrary
assumptions and data having little or no relationship to going concern
value at the date of taking. If the cost incurred in developing going
concern assets was inflated by poor management, inefficient operation,
and extravagant spending, the sum of these cost figures has no real
relation to a present going concern value.84 In applying this theory,
courts should judge the propriety of the charges claimed to have been
incurred in developing the going concern. The time factor may also
introduce extraneous elements into the calculation, since a develop-
ment cost incurred some time prior to the taking may have little or
no relationship to the going concern value of the property at the date
of taking.8 5 Similarly, development costs may vary with the location
of the property; such variance could completely upset the valuation
equation, since an urban utility with low development costs should
have a greater going concern value than a rural utility with higher
development costs.
Closely related to the development cost theory is the broader
"liquidation asset value" determinant. This method would have been
particularly useful in the PATH case or wherever an entity has long
been without earning power. In applying liquidation asset value,
deductions should be made from gross liquidation asset value for the
expenses of liquidating the assets. Each item of property should be
given a detailed valuation, which may result in more money being
paid for the entity than its worth as a going concern. Nevertheless,
this method may be fairer to all parties concerned, and is generally
adopted in railroad mergers. In the Pennsylvania and New Haven
railroad merger, the Interstate Commerce Commission determined
that even though "the total value of the New Haven sold as a going
concern is less than its liquidation value,"86 the liquidation value should
be the price paid by the Pennsylvania. Nothing was added for going
concern value.87
placement. The rule is qualified, however, by the holding that it is applicable only if a
replacement is "necessary." Note, just Compensation and the Public Condemnee, 75 YArx
L.J. 1053 (1966).
84 Kashman, Going-Concern Value of a Public Utility in Condemnation by a Munic-
ipality, 6 Auz L. REv. 92, 97 (1964).
85 Id.
88 Pennsylvania Railroad Company-Merger-New York Central Railroad Company,
Interstate Commerce Commission, Finance Docket No. 21989, at 62 (decided November 16,
1967). The Commission found that the New Haven had neither earning power nor the
prospect of earning power. Id.
87 It is not realistic to assume that a potential buyer would pay the liquidated
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A third formula is the market value of outstanding securities. 88
Assuming that a turnover of a substantial amount of a utility's out-
standing stock could be projected, sale prices for this stock would
reflect the value of the business. The total stock price could reflect a
market estimate of the future net earnings of the operation and could
constitute a rough index of an exchange price for the entire property.
To be meaningful, these stock projections must be in a market volume
sufficient to reflect the value of the entire business.89 In most circum-
stances sole reliance on this method is questionable. Many factors that
do not affect going concern value affect the market value of the com-
pany's stock. For example, if advance information were available re-
garding a prospective condemnation, quotations for the company stock
would be influenced and thus lose their value as indicators of fair mar-
ket value at the date of taking.90 In addition, most utilities are closely
held and do not provide a broad market base of recent actual sales suf-
ficient to project a fair market value for the enterprise.91 Prices of listed
securities may fluctuate for social, economic, or political reasons having
no bearing on the condition or operation of the subject utility;92 the
company may be overcapitalized or may pay unnecessarily large sala-
ries.93 On the other hand, efficient management may elect to put surplus
earnings into capital improvements rather than declare dividends.9 4
Subject to these limitations, however, the "security value" method of
appraisal should be competent evidence in valuing utility assets. The
lower court opinion in the PATH case indicated, on the facts of
that case, that security valuation would have no validity in terms of
fixing the fair market value of a condemned utility.95 This statement
may be erroneous to the extent that bond transactions might have
shown speculators clamoring to buy in because of the condemnation.
This method should certainly be used in a proper case in the future.
A fourth formula for compensation is capitalization of net earn-
value of the NH assets and then pay additional amounts representing elements
of going concern in the face of NH past deficit operations and its bleak prospects
for the future.
Id. at 61-62.
88 1 BoNBaiGrr 444-46.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 446.
91 Id.
92 Kashman, supra note 84, at 98.
93 See Bardstown & Louisville Turnpike Co. v. Nelson County, 117 Ky. 674, 684, 78
S.W. 851, 855 (1904).
94 Kashman, supra note 84, at 97-98.
95 48 Misc. 2d at 531, 265 N.YS.2d at 971-72.
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ings.9 6 Assuming an accurate history of earnings properly reported, this
method eliminates some of the shortcomings of the development cost
theory's basis in early cost figures having no relation to present value.
But since most utilities are regulated, earnings may not reflect their
actual going concern value.97 Also, reliance on a pattern of earnings
requires projecting a future life for a company that as a regulated
entity is subject to rate changes and discontinuance as a private enter-
prise by condemnation.9" For these and other reasons, this approach
has been uniformly rejected by the courts. 9
Another method of valuation is the percent method, which in-
volves the use of a percentage, usually ten percent,100 of the tangible
asset value of the company as the value of the intangible going concern
assets. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Fifth Avenue, this
method is the most arbitrary. A percentage proper for a business of
one size or kind may be improper for a business of another size or
kind.101 The method might be sound if a sufficiently large sampling of
utility valuations were available so that "normal" percentages for dif-
ferent types of utilities and different size operations could be estab-
lished, but at present we lack such experience. Reference to rate-
making cases is inappropriate because rate-making is directed toward
determining a fair return on investment for a regulated business rather
than the calculation of exchange value.102
In applying any of these methods the position of those to be com-
pensated should be considered. If the compensation is to be "just,"
then it should go to those who have a "real interest" that is being
taken. There is no question that compensating the owners in Fifth
Avenue was just. But in PA TH, the primary beneficiaries of the award
were speculators. All stockholder interests, both common and preferred,
were wiped out during the bankruptcy proceedings and only secured
96 1 BommRcn 440-44.
97 In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 18 N.Y.2d 212, 220-21,
219 N.E.2d 410, 412-13, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55-56 (1966).
98 4 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 15.41(1), at 816 (rev. Sd ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as NxcHoLs].
99 2 ORGEL §§ 216, 218.
Despite its problems, capitalization of net earnings might be useful where there is
a stable pattern of regulation for utilities similarly situated. For example, if fares are
uniform over most of the state, the problem of differing regulation for each utility is
eliminated. Thus if the utility showed substantially greater earnings than other utilities
similarly situated and subject to identical regulation, capitalization of income would re-
flect relatively higher going concern value for the subject.
100 See, e.g., International Ry. v. Prendergast, 1 F. Supp. 623, 629-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1932).
101 New York & Richmond Gas Co. v. Prendergast, 10 F-2d 167, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1925).
102 1 BONDRIGrr 436-40.
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creditors remained to be paid off. The stockholders appealed to the
Second Circuit to be allowed to participate in the newly formed cor-
porations, arguing that the railroad possessed commercial value because
is was likely to be condemned by a public agency for continued oper-
ation, but the court rejected the argument. 10 3 The Court of Appeals
ignored this holding, and in so doing permitted awards to investors
who had purchased the securities at heavily discounted figures. Its
decision was ill-considered, since the decision could well force state
and local governments to allow privately owned, insolvent transit facili-
ties to grind to a halt rather than pay the owners of such facilities sums
well in excess of the economic worth of their enterprises-sums pred-
icated solely upon the public need. When the transit system ceases
operations because of lack of funds, a public agency could acquire the
physical assets of the defunct facility on a liquidation basis without
paying a large windfall to speculators. The public, of course, would be
the loser since it would suffer the discomforts of allowing a mass transit
facility to run itself into the ground.
It should be apparent that the best approach to utility condemna-
tion is to use each valuation method for whatever merit it may have.104
New York courts appear to take the unreasonable position that the
development cost theory should be used to the exclusion of any other
valuation formula. In private condemnation cases it took a number of
years to persuade courts to look at different appraisal techniques to
value condemned property 05 Only recently have the courts in private
condemnations accepted evidence by way of comparable market sales,
capitalization of income, and reproduction cost; the theory now, how-
ever, is that each method is competent for consideration by the court
for whatever it is worth in terms of reflecting the value of the particular
condemned property.10 6 Similar reasoning should govern the use of
103 Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1960). The court commented:
The only invariable principle of valuation in condemnation proceedings is
that the award should reflect what the owner has lost; the criterion is not what
the taker has gained. In the absence of a market value, this may properly be
determined by what the property "brings in the way of earnings to its owner."
Where the property is incapable of producing earnings, "junk value" may be
appropriate.
Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
104 See National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 F. 853, 864-66 (8th Cir. 1894).
105 Cf. Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 10.
106 In re Huie, 2 N.Y.2d 168, 171, 139 N.E.2d 140, 142, 157 N.Y.S.2d 957, 960-61
(1956). The precise question of the applicability in the condemnation of a public utility
of different methods of compensation-methods other than the development cost theory
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in the Fifth Avenue and PATH cases-was con-
sidered in In re City of Rochester (Rochester Transit Corp.), 57 Misc. 2d 645, 648, 293
N.Y.52d 475, 478 (Sup. Ct. 1968), where the court commented:
The answer, as I see it, to the contention that the Fifth Ave. Coach Lines
[Vol. 55:402
PUBLIC UTILITY CONDEMNATION
appraisal techniques in valuing utilities. Use of all these methods,
properly limited and applied, is necessary to provide a court with the
maximum assistance in determining fair market value for the con-
demned utility.
B. Franchise As a Separate Valuation Component
In valuing a transit system condemned by a public authority, the
Court of Appeals characterized a franchise as "property," in the consti-
tutional sense of the term,107 for which the owner must be compensated.
A franchise is the privilege of continued operation of a business at a
particular location or, in the case of an omnibus line, over certain
routes. It usually represents an excess of value over the market value
of the tangible property employed in a business. Whether it is a sepa-
rate valuation component or an element of going concern value is not
important so long as some specific recognition is given it.
Examination of the principal arguments against compensating for
the "franchise" provides an insight into the nature of this element of
value. All franchises are subject to the inherent power of government
to revoke them, and it can thus be argued that the condemning gov-
ernmental authority is not gaining any asset vital to its operation of the
utility.10SJust compensation, however, is based upon loss to the owner,
not value to the taker. To the owner, the franchise may be a valuable
asset, as in Rochester,0 9 or it may be the continuance of a net loss oper-
ation, as in PA TH. 0 In one case, the right to do business is valuable
and compensable; in the other, it is neither valuable nor compensable.
Another argument against compensation is that the "franchise"
is not condemned; the only items taken are the tangible assets of the
entity. Such an argument is metaphysically sound but economically
and Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. cases mandate a reproduction cost, less de-
preciation, plus "going concern" value rule is given by Judge BUrKaF in his dis-
senting opinion in Matter of Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. (supra, p. 475),
when he says: "The majority is correct in asserting that determination of the
just compensation to which one whose property has been taken under the power
of eminent domain is entitled, is, as the cases reveal, not subject to 'rigid rules.'"
107 See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1949); Los Angeles
v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 39 (1919).
108 "The city did not need to acquire these franchises in order to operate the buses
over the routes theretofore used by claimants, since the city always had the right to do
so." In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 17,
1967), in 157 N.Y.L.J., April 18, 1967, at 19, col. 4. See also 19 N.Y. JuR. Eminent Domain
§ 236, at 482 (1961). But see National Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 F. 853 (8th Cir.
1894) (utility awarded going concern value for an expired franchise); 2 ORGEL§ 21& and
cases cited in n.117 therein.
109 The Rochester Transit Corporation, at the time of taking, had an operational
profit of approximately half a million dollars per annum.
110 See note 49 supra.
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untenable. Retention of a franchise without the means of exercising
it amounts to a de facto condemnation of the privilege to do business'
even within the rationale of the "no direct taking" argument.
When a franchise is viewed as a privilege of continuance, it is
similar to another intangible asset, a compensable item in private con-
demnations-goodwill. 112 It is useful to distinguish the two concepts
in order better to understand the nature of a franchise. 13 First, since
a utility is a regulated business often conducted as a geographic mo-
nopoly, the impetus of competition is not present to force the conduct
of operations in a manner likely to generate goodwill." 4 Second, in a
private business goodwill is generated from within; in a regulated
business, the franchise is a contractual right or license bestowed from
without by a public authority. However, since it may be possible to
hypothesize goodwill for a utility by recognizing regulation as a
substitute for competition,"'5 the analysis is imperfect.
In the regulated market, goodwill may be equated with an ef-
ficiency of operation"O resulting in a maximum allowable return to
investors and the best possible service to customers. In this case, the
franchise is viewed as nothing more than the initially acquired license.
In PATH, value to the public was an indispensable prerequisite to
the taking and to the rationale that the owner should be compensated
11 Eighth Avenue Coach Corp. v. City of New York, 286 N.Y. 84, 35 N.E.2d 907
(1941); In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 29 App. Div. 2d 638,
639, 287 N.Y.S.2d 454, 455 (1st Dep't 1968) (dissent). It is immaterial that any particular
franchise is non-exclusive since we are focusing on the right which a particular claimant
is deprived of by reason of the condemnation. Similar reasoning requires compensation
for a franchise even if it is revocable at will.
112 Goodwill is treated as property which may be sold in bankruptcy proceedings
along with other tangible assets. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975, 977
(2d Cir. 1940). See also Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 10, at 626-36.
"13 The trial judge in the Fifth Avenue case appeared to equate goodwill with going
concern value. In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 46 Misc. 2d 14,
18, 259 N.Y.S.2d 313, 320 (Sup. Ct. 1964). The definitional problem of goodwill vis-bt-vis
going concern value is apparently shared by the United States Supreme Court. Compare
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 1-10 (1949), with Des Moines Gas Co.
v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1915). See also Note, supra note 62, at 754 & n.17.
114 Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180, 202 (1910).
115 This function of rate-making is illustrated by the often quoted maxim that in
rate regulation the purpose is to determine what would be a fair return on the invest-
ment in the plant of the company. Without regulation or competition this inquiry would
be moot; the company could earn whatever return was possible on the investment. See,
e.g., J. BAuER & H. GOLD, PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION FOR PUMROSEs OF R TE CONTROL
(1934); J. GRAY & J. LEviN, THE VALUATION AND REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1933).
116 Cf. the concept of marginal efficiency, Aloi & Goldberg, supra note 10, at 622-26
& nn.87-95.
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on the basis of development cost. Should an additional increment be
paid if a company is either profitable, as in Rochester, or, but for un-
reasonable rate regulation, capable of being profitable, as in Fifth
Avenue? Is the additional increment really goodwill as ordinarily un-
derstood or is it simply another element of the owner's loss-a loss
reflected in the public's acquisition of a healthy company?117 Regard-
less, the courts have neither equated franchise value with goodwill
nor made separate awards for goodwill in the condemnation of a
utility.
Assuming that a franchise is recognized as a separate element of
value, how is the value determined? The Court of Appeals paid scant
attention to this problem. One method might be a cost approach based
upon a present projection of the expenditures required to obtain
operating privileges identical to those owned by the company. If a
capitalization of earnings approach were used to value the going con-
cern assets of the utility, the problem would disappear since any figure
arrived at by that method necessarily would include a value for the
franchise.118 If regulation prevents the company from actually earning
a profit, a pattern of hypothetical earnings could be constructed on the
assumption that unreasonable regulation would be removed. The rate
would remain in question. Another method might be "comparable
sales." This would involve projection of a private sale value for a fran-
chise by inquiring into any transfers of utility companies within a rea-
sonable time of the date of taking which involved a transfer of franchise
from one private owner to another." 9
117 This distinction was noted by Judge Burke in dissent in PATH. In re Port
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 474-75 (1967). See also Note, supra note 72.
118 "The value of the franchise may be reached by capitalizing the income which
would probably be earned during its existence over and above a fair return upon the
tangible property in the plant." 4 NIcHOLs § 15.42(1). Nichol's method assumes the
existence of income and also leaves unanswered the question of apportioning the income
between tangible assets and the franchise.
119 In Fifth Avenue the owners attempted such proof. The trial judge rejected the
data and argued that the allegedly comparable sales were of utilities operating under fare
structures different than the subject's, despite a similar "average asset mix." In re City of
New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 46 Misc. 2d 14, 25, 259 N.Y.S.2d 313, 327
(Sup. Ct. 1964). This determination by the trial judge remained undisturbed on appeal.
A comparable earnings standard has been suggested for rate regulation. Leventhal, Vital-
ity of the Comparable Earnings Standard for Regulation of Utilities in a Growth
Economy, 74 YALE L.J. 989 (1965). Given the continuing problem as to whether regulation,
at least for purposes of condemnation, is "reasonable," it is unlikely that comparative
earnings will be of any use in fixing the award in condemnation. Cf. In re City of
Rochester (Rochester Transit Corporation), 57 Misc. 2d 645, 648, 293 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477-78
(sup. Ct. 1968).
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C. Consequential Damages for Pension Liability
The Court of Appeals's failure in the Fifth Avenue case to award
compensation for items of damage, particularly pension liability, con-
sidered under the classification of "consequential damages" is unsatis-
factory both as to results and reasoning. We are not concerned here
with any novel class of items claimed to be compensable, but rather
with specific items that would be compensated for under some methods
of valuation. For example, pension liability could have been considered
by the Court of Appeals in the Fifth Avenue case as a component of
the utility's development cost under the category "trained personnel."
Alternatively, separate consideration of pensions would be unnecessary
if the owner were compensated by the capitalization of income method
on the basis of earnings calculated before the deduction of pension
payments. Thus the issue is not whether "consequential damages"-the
term is used only because the courts have used it-are compensable in
the abstract, but whether pension liability, if not taken into account
by the method of valuation employed, should be separately accounted
for.
It may seem that the company can be liable only for the pensions
of employees who have already retired at the time of the condemna-
tion. Under traditional contract rules, no pensions are owing to
employees ineligible to retire at the time of condemnation, since em-
ployees seeking pension payments must as a condition precedent per-
form every condition in the collective bargaining agreement.120 The
same rule may prevent company liability to employees who are eligible
for a pension but who have elected to continue services in order to
retire at an increased pension; arguably one must not only perform
the required services but also retire to become eligible for a pension.
There is, however, a line of cases imposing liability on the com-
pany, notwithstanding the failure to fulfill the conditions precedent
of service for a given number of years and retirement.121 Departing
from strict contract law, these cases hold that where a pension plan is
terminated by external conditions beyond the control of employees (as,
for example, by private discontinuation of business or condemnation)
120 See Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 219 App. Div. 361, 220 N.Y.S. 134 (2d Dep't 1927);
Dolge v. Dolge, 70 App. Div. 517, 521, 75 N.Y.S. 386, 387 (4th Dep't 1902); McNevin v.
Solvay Process Co., 32 App. Div. 610, 612-13, 53 N.Y.S. 98, 99-100 (4th Dep't 1898). See also
Upholsterers' Int'l Union v. American Pad & Textile Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1967);
Bromberg v. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., 19 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. 66, 203 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1951).
121 See Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and
Some Proposals, 76 HAiv. L. REV. 952 (1963).
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failure of these employees to fulfill contractual conditions precedent
to pension payments cannot be termed willful or a breach of their
pension contract obligations; accordingly, they are entitled to a pro
rata share of their pension benefits in relation to the amount of services
they were able to perform.1 22 This analysis views pension payments as
a component of wages; to cut off all pension payments where the em-
ployee had at least partially performed the required services results
in unjust enrichment to the employer. 23 To some extent, this view
has been incorporated in those state and federal statutes that require
the condemnor to continue active employees in the service of the new
company and accord them their full pension benefits in terms of prior
contracts.124 In this limited instance, the employees will not be ad-
versely affected by a finding that the private owner is not responsible
for their pensions.
In Fifth Avenue the trial court ruled that regardless of the com-
panies' liability for pensions, 125 no compensation need be paid for what
amounts to a frustration of subsisting contractual liability.126 The
122 E.g., Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 38 (D. Minn. 1967).
123 Insofar as a pension can be said to be "wages" and a "condition of employment"
under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 and the Wagner Act, it is possible
to argue a breach of statutory rights where pensions are cut off for whatever reason.
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 960 (1949).
124 See § 755 of the Wicks Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 751-757 (McKinney 1949).
Similarly, the applicable federal statutes condition federal assistance for municipal con-
demnation of utilities upon the guarantee by the municipal condemnor that pension
rights for employees of the private corporation-wil be preserved at least at the level of
existence under private collective bargaining agreements. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1609(c) (Supp.
1969).
125 In Scoville v. Surface Transit, Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 991, 242 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct.
1963), an action incidental to the Fifth Avenue litigation, the employees' union established
that the company was liable for the pensions of retired employees after the date of taking.
The court's assumption that the company would in any event be reimbursed for pension
payments was dispositive, but the assumption proved to be false. Considering questions
of liability and compensation in separate lawsuits has prevented full consideration of the
issues.
126 46 Misc. 2d at 37-43, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 339-44. The case most often cited for the
"no compensation for frustration" rule is Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S.
502 (1923).
The trial court may also have considered that pension liability was an item of "dam-
age" only because of Fifth Avenue's accounting methods. Like many utilities, Fifth Avenue
paid pensions exclusively out of current operating revenues rather than setting up
an annuity. The method is intended to make it difficult for employees' unions to argue
that pension rights are vested and part of the wage package bargained for. The trial court
said:
These items might properly be chargeable to revenues as a bookkeeping matter
while a corporation continues in business, but they are not obligations which a
purchaser is required to assume.
The city is paying all current operating expenses. It may not be charged
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frustration doctrine is usually applied to defeat a claim against the
condemnor by a third party having contractual rights against the con-
demnee, and it may be that the court was confused in applying the
doctrine to a claim by the condemnee. But the court may instead have
applied the frustration doctrine to hypothetical claims by the em-
ployees, using an unexpressed theory of subrogation; assuming the
company is liable to the employees, whether the company has a right
to compensation depends on whether the employees, had their rights
against the company not survived the condemnation, would have had
a right against the condemnor. If this was its reasoning, the court ig-
nored cases holding that compensation can be paid for frustration of
contract rights where the subject matter of the contract is part of the
res taken. 27 Even in PA TH, where the assets were otherwise without
continuing value, pensions ensure development and retention of
trained personnel and thus contribute to the going concern value of
the business. In both Fifth Avenue and PATH the Court of Appeals
stated that the utility property-the res-included the intangible going
concern value of the business.
Not compensating the condemnee for pensions when the con-
demnee is liable for these items puts the condemnor in a preferred
position. In a private transaction frustration is a defense to any action
on the contract;' 28 therefore, a private purchaser could not have pen-
sions paid to his employees at no cost to him. Moreover, liability may
be imposed on any citizen who induces a breach of contract-but not
so where the wrongdoer is the public condemnor.129
The trial court did not approach the ultimate issue of who, the
condemnor or the condemnee, is the superior risk bearer for pension
payments. Where pension payments are funded from the fare box, as
in Fifth Avenue, it is just and equitable that final responsibility for
pensions follow the fare box into the hands of the public owner. With
respect to employees already retired, the condemnor has the assets of
the business, including going concern assets, to which each of the
retired employees contributed in varying degrees. With respect to
with these deferred expenses attributable to obligations assumed by the con-
demnee prior to condemnation.
46 Misc. 2d at 41, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
127 A.W. Duckett Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924); Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v.
United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 307 (1944).
128 E.g., Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484, 156 N.Y.S. 179
(2d Dep't 1915); RP-MATrrMNT OF CONTRACrS § 468(2) (1932). See Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages; 1, 46 YALx LJ. 52, 89-96 (1936).
129 Cf. Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HAnv. L. REv. 728, 745
(1928); Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HAv. L. REv. 663 (1923).
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employees still working, their collective knowledge, skill, and experi-
ence enable the condemnor to continue the transit facility without
interruption.180 Where pensions are funded, the condemnor need not
pay pensions to employees already retired, since an independent fund,
presumably amortized during the time of private ownership, exists
for that purpose. For active employees, the condemnor need pay only
the amount remaining to vest the funding for each employee who
continues in his service. In this case the condemnor does not acquire
a fare box encumbered by pension payments, but it does acquire tan-
gible and intangible assets of the business to which these employees
contributed during private employment as well as their continued
service during public ownership.
Notwithstanding the language by the Court of Appeals that com-
pensation must be paid for "[c]laimants' undeniably competent and
efficient personnel ... taken over by the city along with claimants'
routes, franchises, operating schedules, accounting and maintenance
records, etc.,"'131 the failure by the Court of Appeals to hold conse-
quential damage compensable or to otherwise compensate for pensions
now permits a condemnor to take the position that it will not in-
130 Judge Shientag's comment in Felder v. Fullen, 27 N.Y.S.2d 699, 708 (Sup. Ct.
1941), is worthy of note in this regard:
By virtue of the Wicks Act the City of New York was enabled to acquire much
more than an aggregation of physical assets. It was enabled to take over going
concerns and to acquire the collective knowledge, skill and experience of the
staff of great railroad systems, without which uninterrupted and efficient op-
eration might well have been impaired, if not rendered impossible.
A question might be raised as to the propriety of imposing responsibility for pension
payments on the condemnor for all employees not retired at the date of taking where
many employees might have long periods of service remaining before qualification for
pensions while others conceivably could qualify for retirement pensions the day after
the taking. Is it not unjust to treat these classes of employees equally where the public
owner obviously will derive little or no benefit from those employees who will qualify for
an early pension after the date of taking? The answer is no-the fact remains that the
private owner paying pensions from the fare box has given this means of payment to
the condemnor. Any argument that the obligation for paying pensions to the active em-
ployees must be weighted in proportion to the years of service remaining after the taking
ignores the fact that it is the employee with the shortest time remaining to qualify for a
pension who in all probability had the opportunity to make the largest contribution to
the tangible and intangible assets of the business-assets now owned by the public.
131 After the transfer to the public, the public condemnor may raise fares at will
without restraint from the Public Service Commission. The private company, on the other
hand, is no longer an operational entity, in all likelihood it will be in liquidation at the
time payments must be made. If the company has funds on hand at the time of con-
demnation, it is improper to assume that these funds can be earmarked solely for pensions.
Any number of liabilities such as personal injury claims, accrued vacations, officers' salary
settlements, and trustees and consultants fees on liquidation, might be payable out of
the funds. In addition, the company's final tax liability may also be payable therefrom.
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demnify a utility for pension payments for which a court may later
hold the utility responsible.132 A court approaching the problem of
fixing responsibility for pension payments between condemnor and
condemnee has two choices to avoid this dilemma. The court could
order the private company to continue pension payments for all retired
employees although the condemnor acquired both the benefits of the
fare box and the company as a going concern. Alternatively, the court
could order the public condemnor to make these payments with the
caveat that as to any payment so made, the condemnor apply for an
offset from any award thereafter made for going concern value. If the
second alternative were chosen, a court fixing a going concern value
for the trained personnel component should discount the award by
the payments made after determining personnel development costs
not only in terms of placement and wages but also pensions. The second
alternative is superior to the first because the condemnor is in a posi-
tion to make a present payment by virtue of its possession of the fare
box.133
D. The Role of the Public Service Commission in Utility
Condemnation
Since neither the omnibus lines in Fifth Avenue nor the Hudson
tubes in PATH were under the jurisdiction of the New York State
Public Service Commission,'134 the litigation did not consider the
propriety of the role reserved to the Public Service Commission in
the condemnation of a public utility by section 5-a of the Condemna-
tion Law.13 5 The principles developed in those cases demand a re-
132 In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219,
219 N.E.2d 410, 415, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52, 58 (1966).
133 This in fact occurred in Rochester, New York, immediately after the condemna-
tion of the Rochester Transit Corporation's omnibus line by the City of Rochester. See
Case No. 24794, before the New York State Public Service Commission: Proceeding re the
Condemnation by the City of Rochester of Properties of Rochester Transit Corporation
(1969). See also note 125 supra.
134 The omnibus lines were regulated by the City of New York; the Hudson tubes
were subject to an interstate compact.
'35 This section provides in relevant part as follows:
In any proceeding to condemn substantially all of the property owned by a
person or corporation subject to the jurisdiction, supervision and regulation of
the public service commission, or any portion of such property constituting an
operating unit or system, a copy of the petition and notice of time and place of
presentation must be served on the public service commission at least thirty days
prior to the presentation. Such commission shall certify to the court after a hear-
ing by such commission on notice to all of the parties to such proceeding, the
following: (1) the annual earnings which might reasonably be anticipated by
the present owner thereof pursuant to just and reasonable rates, with due regard
among other things to a reasonable average return upon capital actually ex-
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examination of New York's statutory procedure; 136 in fact, the Fifth
Avenue and PATH principles may make the Commission's statutory
role in condemnation actions an unconstitutional anachronism.137
Enacted in 1952 as a legislative response to a number of scandal-
ridden condemnation cases where excessive awards had been improp-
erly paid to condemnees, 138 section 5-a provides for the use of capitaliza-
tion of earnings in the valuation of a condemned utility. The legislation
was designed to eliminate lump-sum awards based on cost by directing
pended and to the necessity of making reservations out of income for surplus and
contingencies; and (2) the rate base and the rate of return from which its estimate
of earnings is derived. Such certification shall be served upon the court and the
commissioners of appraisal if theretofore appointed. The commissioners of ap-
praisal in such proceeding shall not ascertain and determine the amount of com-
pensation to be made by the plaintiff to the owners of the property appraised
by them, until thirty days after such certification has been so served, and, in the
event that a proceeding pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice
law and rules is commenced within such thirty-day period, until after it has been
finally determined.
N.Y. CONDEm. LAW § 5-a (McKinney Supp. 1969). In addition, § 18 provides in relevant
part:
In any proceeding in which certification by the public service commission as
provided in section five-a of this chapter is required, if the final order directs
the payment of any amount as compensation to the owners which is (1) not a
capitalization of the anticipated earnings of such company as certified to the
court by the public service commission; or (2) is, in the opinion of the public
service commission, so excessive or insufficient as to be not in the public interest,
such commission shall, within such time and upon such notice, apply to the
court for such an order [pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice
law and rules].
Id. § 18.
136 It is likely that the Public Service Commission statute will be applied in most
subsequent utility condemnations. A recent example is the Rochester Transit Corporation
litigation, note 133 supra.
137 A collateral issue raised by the continuing role of the Public Service Commission
is whether the security (undertaking) provision of the Condemnation Law, § 24, which
entities an owner to indemnification for any damage incurred by reason of the dis-
continuance of a condemnation by the municipality, applies to a condemnation com-
menced under special enabling legislation. If the enabling statute is silent on the question
of security or discontinuance but reserves to the Public Service Commission the prerogative
to certify earnings under § 5-a of the Condemnation Law, the Commission's power under
§ 18 of the Condemnation Law to veto an award, with the possible consequence of the
return of the property to the owner, arguably requires the municipality to post an un-
dertaking to indemnify the owner for any damage to his property while under municipal
possession and control. On the other hand, it may be that property condemned pursuant
to special enabling legislation must remain in public ownership and cannot be returned
to the private owner, notwithstanding the Commission's disapproval of the award; this
is apparently the view taken in City of Rochester v. Rochester Transit Corp., 31 App.
Div. 2d 787, - N.Y.S.2d - (4th Dep't 1969). If this view is correct, Commission disap-
proval must result in a new trial, and if the court and the Commission cannot agree on
the amount of the award, the court, the parties, and the Commission may be thrust
into a circular process of continuous relitigation.
138 N.Y. Laws 1952, ch. 508, § 1; N.Y. Laws 1952, ch. 515, § 1.
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"the attention of the courts and commissioners of appraisal to the gen-
eral desirability of the result derived by capitalizing the income which
the private company could be expected to earn while subject to regu-
lation as a public utility."'u 9 Section 5-a may also have been prompted
by the then-obtaining rules for valuing public utilities in condemna-
tions. Condemned utilities were at that time valued by a fragmented
approach; the total value was calculated by taking the sum of the
component elements of tangible property.140 The rules were unsettled
regarding valuation of intangible property-goodwill, franchise value,
and going concern value. Awards for each of these components of the
utility's intangible property were either not made or sloughed off as
some undefined component of an over-all lump-sum award.' 4'
Section 5-a is unsatisfactory in view of Fifth Avenue and PATH,
in that it applies principles of rate-making to condemnation valuation.
In public utility rate-making the Commission makes two findings: a
rate base is determined, and a rate of return is calculated on this rate
base. 42 The utility's permissible earnings are then determined by
multiplying the rate base by the rate of return. 4 Presumably, the
rate of return employed in the formula is calculated by comparison
with the average rates of return in comparable businesses, i.e., enter-
prises with risks similar to that of the utility in question. The rate
base-the cumulative value of the assets of the business upon which
the private owner will be permitted to earn a return (profit)-is cal-
culated on the basis of the original investment cost of the utility,
nominally the book value of the tangible assets.' 44 Statutory certifica-
139 N.Y. Laws 1952, ch. 508, § 1.
140 See, e.g., In re City of Redding, 1919 P.U.R. 415, 420 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n).
141 Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 154 Wis. 121, 148, 142 N.W. 476,
484 (1913), is illustrative.
142 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 61 (McKinney 1955) outlining the Commission's
powers with respect to omnibus lines.
Unlike an electric utility, the tangible assets of an omnibus line may be fully
depreciated but still be serviceable. In this drcumstance, the Public Service Commission
has indicated that neither rate-making nor a § 5-a proceeding may be based on certifica-
tion of a rate base; instead, the Commission determines what it considers a fair operating
ratio between operating expenses and operating revenues. 1962 REPORT OF THE PUB. SERV.
COMM'N TO THE N.Y. STATE LEGISLATURE 85. See generally Comment, Operating Ratio-A
Rate Base For The Transit Industry, 51 IowA L. REv. 417 (1966). This alternative method
is not described in the statute.
143 See Note, Condemnation of Public Utilities: A New York Statute And a New
Approach, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 916, 919 & n.20 (1954).
144 In re New York Tel. Co., 91 P.U.R. (n.s.) 281 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1951). The statutory
provisions include N.Y. PUB. SEav. Lw §§ 49, 72, 85, 89, 97 (McKinney 1955).
Commissions in other states employ what is called a "fair value" approach, based upon
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tion in a condemnation action is like rate-making in that it calls for
the calculation of estimated future earnings, 145 which are then cap-
italized. The variables in the equation are the earnings thus certified 146
and the capitalization rate.
If the rate of return is the capitalization rate, the rate base must
equal the capitalized valuation. The result, therefore, will be a valua-
tion that does not take into account the intangible assets of the utility,
since original investment cost, by definition, excludes the intangibles
of going concern value, goodwill, and franchise value. In addition, the
utility is deprived of compensation for the difference between the
reproduction cost and the original cost of the assets.147 Both Fifth
Avenue and PATH mandate payment for intangible assets of the con-
demned utility and the use of appraisals based upon new or original
reproduction cost, rather than salvage or scrap value.148 If the owner
is left with no more than the original cost of its tangible assets, the
necessity for a hearing before the Public Service Commission is ob-
viated; the only material required is a certified statement setting forth
the original cost of the tangible assets. Such a procedure is obviously
repugnant to the principles of Fifth Avenue and PATH. Suffice to say
that reliance upon rate-making principles in condemnation proceedings
an estimate of the total present worth of the utility in terms of the reproduction cost
of tangible assets, including the value of intangibles but excluding those attributable in
theory to the utility's monopoly position. See Rose, The Hope Case and Public Utility
Valuation in the States, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 188, 195 (1954).
145 N.Y. CoNnEr. LAw § 5-a (McKinney Supp. 1969).
146 In arriving at future earnings, the Commission is likely to consult the filed records
and reports of the subject company. This was the procedure relied upon in the recent 5-a
hearing held in the condemnation of the Rochester Transit Corporation by the City of
Rochester. See Case No. 24794, before the New York State Public Service Commission:
Proceeding re the Condemnation by the City of Rochester of Properties of Rochester
Transit Corporation (1969). If the reports show a depressed earnings pattern and the
Commission selects from these reports an average figure for certification as future earnings,
the procedure conflicts with the first Fifth Avenue opinion; the court there held that the
owners were entitled to compensation based upon a capability of profitable operations
where low earnings in the past were directly related to severe rate regulations by the
city. In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 18 N.Y.2d 212, 221, 219
N.E2d 410, 413, 273 N.Y.S.2d 52, 56 (1966).
147 See Note, supra note 143, at 922-23.
148 This, of course, is the clear thrust of the Court of Appeals's opinions in Fifth
Avenue. In re City of New York (Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc.), 22 N.Y.2d 618, 241
N.E.2d 717, 294 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1968), and 18 N.Y.2d 212, 219 N.E.2d 410, 273 N.Y..2d 52
(1966); cf. In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 231 N.E.2d 734, 285
N.Y.S.2d 24 (1967). The original cost formula adopted in PATH may be closer to the book
value rule applied by the Commission. However, even the Commission has recognized
that data which are proper in rate-making may be improper in condemnation. In re
Western New York Water Co., 97 P.U.R. (ns.) 428 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1952).
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is unsound because of the generic difference between the two proce-
dures.149
Perhaps a more fundamental defect in the section 5-a proceeding
is that it enables an administrative body to exercise a final veto over
the judicial determination of just compensation. Notwithstanding the
obvious inadequacy of the 5-a procedure in light of the new cases,
this administrative veto is itself unconstitutional.150
149 In enacting § 5-a, the legislature arguably intended to impose on the courts,
the Public Service Commission's rate-making policy of approving utility sales at cost only.
See, e.g., In re South Bay Consolidated Water Co., 92 P.U.R. (n.s.) 90-92 (N.Y.PS.C. 1952);
In re Deer River Power Co., 80 P.U.R. (n.s.) 20-22 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1949); Note, supra note
143, at 922. But the courts have recognized the impropriety of equating rate-making
principles with rules governing condemnation awards. Onondaga County Water Authority
v. New York Water Serv. Corp., 285 App. Div. 655, 662, 139 N.Y.S.2d 755, 763 (4th Dep't
1955).
Concededly, in the early phases of government intervention, there was some legal
basis for equating rate-making with condemnation. Thus, Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466
(1898), discussed in Note, supra note 143, at 927 & n.56, held that rate regulation could
be a "taking" subject to constitutional protections developed in the law of eminent
domain. The regulatory body's computation of a utility's rate base was constitutional
only if it reflected the "fair value" of the utility's property, a value computed on the
basis of both tangible and intangible assets. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272
U.S. 400 (1926); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679 (1923); Misssouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276
(1923). But this view was repudiated in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944),
and with it went any identity between rate-making and condemnation. Although it implicitly
recognized that regulation could destroy value, the Supreme Court there approved
computation of rate base according to the book value of the utility. Further, the Court
permitted use of any valuation method, subject only to the condition that the end result
be reasonable. Id. In response to Hope Natural Gas, most states discontinued inclusion
of going concern value in computing the rate base and relied exclusively on an original
cost rate base. Rose, supra note 144, at 212. Hope Natural Gas also implied that reproduc-
tion cost and appreciated value could be excluded from the rate base for purposes of
regulation. 320 U.S. at 602; cf. ICC v. New York, N.H. & H. Ry., 287 US. 178, 201-02
(1932); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. United States, 265 US. 106, 125 (1924). Once appreciation
is excluded, it is impossible for the utility owner to profit from it during the operation of
the business. Nor can he realize gain from appreciation upon a sale of the utility, since
the purchaser presumably will not pay for a "value" excluded in computing the utility's
reasonable (permissible) earnings. Exclusion of intangibles and emphasis on original cost,
while arguably appropriate in rate regulation, have no place in condemnation, where the
law is now dear that the owner must be compensated for what he has lost, including
all intangible assets. Cf. In re Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 457, 231
N.E.2d 734, 285 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1967), applying an original cost principle for valuation to
tangible property.
150 See In re Keystone Associates v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 78, 89,
224 N.E.2d 700, 703-04. 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 190 (1966), where Judge Keating, in commenting
on another statute, stated
Whether the Legislature intended it or not, the practical effect of the statute
is to set a limit on the amount of recovery. The law of this State is dear that
PUBLIC UTILITY CONDEMNATION
The 5-a procedure should be repealed and its function returned
to the courts. Alternatively, an amendment to the Condemnation Law
could empower a court or commissioners in their discretion to make
the determination called for by section 5-a as revised for consistency
with the new valuation rules. The Public Service Commission might
well have a role to play as an assistant to a court but certainly should
have no veto power over the final award as determined by the court.
CONCLUSION
The Fifth Avenue and PATH cases represent a significant step by
the New York courts in isolating principles applicable to value utility
property upon condemnation (although these principles were misap-
plied in the PATH case). The emphasis upon the standard of the
owner's loss and the classification of certain intangible assets as part
of going concern value should clear the way for application of these
newly defined principles. It is regrettable that the Court of Appeals em-
phasized a development cost theory to the exclusion of other formulas
for compensation, any number of which might be of use to a court
faced with valuation problems depending upon the particular facts
before it. Moreover, the failure of the Court of Appeals to break with
the traditional view on consequential damages, particularly in terms
of pension liabilities, leaves the formulation of rules of compensation
for utility condemnations incomplete. Finally, the new rules make
obvious the shortcomings of section 5-a of the Condemnation Law
which, with its companion provision, section 18, should be repealed or
amended.
the determination of just compensation is a judicial function and that the Legis-
lature cannot set the maximum figure on the amount of compensation that will
be paid.
1970]
